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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE, OF UT All 
T. VAL CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
CASE NO. 15751 
UT AH-IDAHO SUGAR COMPANY, 
a corporation, and UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD, a 
corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT -RESPONDENT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT T 
The Utah case of Soderberg v. Holt clearly holds that when 
a grantor conveys real property by warranty deed, and an 
encumbrance exists thereon such as an easement, not 
involving a money charge upon the land, the statute of 
limitations on grantee's cause of action for breach of the 
covenant against encumbrances begins to run on the date 
of the conveyance. The date the grantee learns of the 
existence of the easement is immaterial. 
The court, in scipport of its reversal of the Summary Judgment 
granted in the above-entitled case by the District Court, stated in its 
opinion that the issue of when Plaintiff-Appellant received notice of the 
easement upon his property was a genuine issue regarding a material 
fact. Defendant-Respondent respectfully requests that the court 
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reevaluate this position on rehearing. Defendant-Respondent does 
not deny that there is a factual issue regarding when Plaintiff-Appellant 
learned of the existence of the easement. But Utah case law clearly 
indicates that this issue is immaterial to the resolution of this action. 
Even if Plaintiff-Appellant first learned of the easement in 1973, as he 
contends, the statute of limitations for any breach of the covenant against 
encumbrances resulting from the existence of the easement had already 
expired many years earlier. 
The Utah case of Soderberg v. Holt, 86 Utah 485, 46 P. 2d 428 
(1935), conclusively supports Defendant-Respondent 1s position on this 
point. This case was cited in Defendant-Respondent's Brief on Appeal 
and its holding was thoroughly discussed on pages 11 through 14 of the 
Brief. The opinion of this court on appeal cites the Soderberg case on 
another point, but it makes no reference to Soderberg's discussion of 
when a cause of action accrues with respect to a breach of the covenant 
against encumbrances. The court's opinion in the present case states that 
"the time the cause of action accrues therefore, is the time at which the 
grantee first receives notice, either actual or constructive, of an 
encumbrance against his property." No citations are given in support 
of this statement. Because this statement is contrary to the holding in 
the Soderberg case, Defendant-Respondent submits that it would be 
appropriate for this court to carefully review the Soderberg case, including 
the discussion thereof in Defendant-Respondent's Brief on Appeal, and 
reconsider its position on this point. If the court chooses to maintain 
-2-
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its present position and reverse the Soderberg case insofar as it conflicts 
with the present opinion, that is a matter for the discretion of this court, 
But if the court chooses to continue to follow the settled rules set forth 
in the Soderberg case, it would appear that it should change its position 
on this rehearing and hold in favor of Defendant-Respondent on this point. 
The court in Soderberg held that in the case of encumbrances 
"which were permanent and which were burdens upon the title, such as an 
easement . . . , " a covenant against them was broken at once and finally 
upon the date of the conveyance, In such cases, the statute of limitations 
for an action for breach of the covenant against encumbrances begins to 
run upon the date of the conveyance. In the present case, the conveyance 
to Plaintiff-Appellant took place in 1945, The encumbrance which existed 
upon the land was an easement, and according to the express language of 
the Soderberg case, the statute of limitations for a cause of action in the 
Plaintiff-Appellant for breach of the covenant against encumbrances 
expired in 1951. Any claim Plaintiff-Appellant may have had for breach 
of said covenant expired over twenty years before this action was filed. 
The date the Plaintiff-Appellant first learned of the existence of the 
easement is absolutely immaterial, and the fact that there is an issue 
regarding that date has no effect upon the propriety of the Summary 
Judgment rendered by the lower court. 
POINT II 
Even if the existence of the easement upon Plaintiff-
Appellant's property prevented him from selling the 
property, Plaintiff-Appellant was never evicted, 
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either actually or constructively, from the property 
as defined in Utah law. 
The opinion of this court in this action appears to indicate that 
there is one other material issue of fact in this case, namely, whether 
the Plaintiff-Appellant lost his property as a result of the existence of 
the easement, or as a result of his own financial problems. Defendant-
Respondent submits that even if the position asserted by Plaintiff-Appellant 
were true, that is, that Plaintiff-Appellant was unable to sell or refinance 
his property as a result of the existence of the easement, and that this 
led to the foreclosure of the mortgage and the forced sale of the property, 
Plaintiff-Appellant would still have no cause of action against Defendant-
Respondent for breach of either the covenant of warranty or the covenant 
against encumbrances. This is because the Plaintiff-Appellant was never 
evicted from his property. 
It is important to clarify the particular manner in which the 
Plaintiff-Appellant lost his property. First, it is clear that the Defendant-
Respondent U & I Sugar Company, Inc, never took any action to evict or 
otherwise remove Plaintiff-Appellant from his property. It is equally 
clear that the Defendant-Respondent Union Pacific Railroad never took 
any action to evict or otherwise remove Plaintiff-Appellant from the 
property. In fact, it is undisputed that the railroad never even threatened 
to remove Plaintiff-Appellant from the property or to enforce its 
easement, 
The undisputed facts show that the parties that foreclosed upon 
-4-
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and sold Plaintiff-Appellant's property were none other than his own 
mortgagees, Dean and Vilate Terry. Plaintiff-Appellant had voluntarily 
given them a mortgage on his property in Hl65. It is undisputed that the 
foreclosure action was taken against the property because Plaintiff-
Appellant failed to make the required mortgage payments. The existence 
of the easement had nothing whatever to do with Plaintiff-Appellant 
borrowing money from the Terrys twenty years after he purchased the 
property, giving them a mortgage on the property, and thereafter failing 
to make the required payments. It was the failure to make mortgage 
payments as required, and not the existence of the easement, that led to 
the foreclosure action and subsequent loss of the property. Plaintiff-
Appellant was never evicted from the property. 
It was the acts of the Plaintiff-Appellant, and not any act of 
Defendant-Respondent, that caused Plaintiff-Appellant to lose his property. 
Certainly he should not be permitted to prevail against Defendant-Responde"' 
when the loss of the property was a consequence of his own actions and not 
a result of the existence of any easement. When Defendant-Respondent 
gave Plaintiff-Appellant the warranty deed to the property, it did not 
warrant that Plaintiff-Appellant would never lose the property as a result 
of his failure to make future mortgage payments on it. It would be unjust 
to place such a burden on a grantor. The grantor should not be 
responsible for the loss of property resulting from grantee's own acts 
which take place long after the conveyance of the property. 
- ~)-
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In East Canyon Land & Stock Company v. Davis and Weber 
Counties Canal Company, 65 utah 560, 238 P. 280 (1925), the utah 
Supreme Court held that "where one seeks to recover for a breach of 
the covenants of warranty of title, he must allege an eviction by one having 
paramount or better title." This view is supported in Van Cott v. Jacklin, 
63 Utah 412, 226 P. 460 (1924). The covenant of warranty of title is 
usually called into play when a grantor conveys property in which a prior 
grantor still claims an interest. When the prior grantor evicts the grantee 
from the property as a result of his having paramount title thereto, the 
grantee has a claim against his grantor for breach of the covenant of 
warranty. In the present case, from Plaintiff-Appellant's contention, the 
railroad had an easement of record across the property conveyed to 
Plaintiff-Appellant, but the railroad never sought to enforce its easement. 
Instead, the Plaintiff-Appellant later lost the property as a result of the 
foreclosure of a mortgage he entered into over twenty years after the 
conveyance to him, not as the result of an eviction. Defendant-Respondent 
should not be responsible for the loss of the property. 
"Eviction," to constitute a breach of the covenant of warranty, must 
be "by one having an adverse or paramount title which existed when the 
covenant was made." Wilder v. Wilhite, 190 Kan. 564, 376 P. 2d 797 
(1962). The mortgage to the Terrys did not exist when the covenant was 
made in this case. No eviction ever took place, The loss of property in 
a foreclosure action, with a subsequent failure to redeem, is not an 
eviction. The factual question of whether or not the existence of the 
-6-
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easement prevented Plaintiff-Appellant from selling or refinancing 
his property is completely immaterial, because the covenants of title 
do not warrant that a party will be able to sell or refinance his property, 
They only provide that he will never be evicted from it, The undisputed 
facts, viewed in light of the case law, show that Plaintiff-Appellant 
was never evicted from the property. The Summary Judgment of the 
District Court was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant-Respondent respectfully submits that the two issues of 
fact cited in the opinion of this court in support of its reversal are not 
material to a determination of the case. Since the statute of limitations 
for breach of the covenant against encumbrances in the case of easements 
begins to run on the date of the conveyance, the date on which the grantee 
learns of the existence of the easement is immaterial. Furthermore, 
since the Plaintiff-Appellant was never evicted from his property, but 
was rather foreclosed upon by one holding a mortgage he voluntarily 
granted over twenty years after the conveyance, the issue of whether the 
existence of the easement prevented Plaintiff-Appellant from selling or 
refinancing his property is immaterial. At most, the existence of the 
easement prevented such sale or refinancing of the property, but even if 
this did occur, it was no breach of the covenants of title. Defendant-
Respondent had nothing to do with the granting or paying of the mortgage, 
and should not be responsible for the loss of the property upon its 
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foreclosure. 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment was properly granted 
by the District Court, and upon rehearing, this court should affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
DATED this--'~-- day of February, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, THURMAN & CONDIE 
By -~...!:'.Jo!ll!!~~~"'-1-a -/2....::in..:e:...'-~.::::.=-~-e-IJg-u_s_o_n __ _ 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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